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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did Plaintiff establish the requisite causal link between 
the treatment rendered by Defendants' to the death of the minor 
child? 
Was proximate causation called into question by the 
defendants in moving for summary judgment sufficiently to require 
Plaintiffs to come forward with evidence of a causal link between 
the purported malpractice and harm for which Plaintiffs sought 
damages? 
Did the Court improperly rule on lack of proximate cause 
when the lower court ruled on the issue of proximate causation 
only from the perspective that intervening events occurred 
superceding any misconduct on the part of the defendants? 
Reference to Opinion Below 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 880347CA, filed March 28, 1990. 
I 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to 
Utah Code Annot. 78-2-2(5) requesting review of a Utah Court of 
Appeals decision filed on March 28, 1990 This court has granted 
an extension of time on April 27, 1990 for Petitioners to file a 
petition by May 27, 1990. 
Controlling Provisions 
Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1987), Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), Restatements 2d of Torts 
sections 431-452, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8, and 
Powell Div. of Dow Chemical U. S. A. v. Del-Rio Drilling 
Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1988). 
Statement of the Case 
Petitioners filed a wrongful death complaint against 
respondents Dr. Nickol, Dr. Okubo, and Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital alleging improper and negligent treatment by respondents 
resulted in their infant child's death. 
The respondents moved for summary judgment at the District 
Court level and were granted summary judgment by an order dated 
January 27, 1988. See addendum "A." Petitioners appealed the 
order granting summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court judgment. See addendum "B." 
Petitioners presented an affidavit of Dr. Jacobs to defeat 




PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY PETITIONER 
The Court of Appeals found that Petitioner did not establish 
the requisite causal link between the Respondent's treatment and 
the infant child's death. See addendum "A" at pages 6 and 7. 
However a close look at the supporting affidavit clearly 
indicates that the issue of proximate cause was sufficiently 
presented by Dr. Jacobs to indicate that Respondents failure to 
follow the standard of care resulted in the death of the parties 
minor child. "The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below 
an accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of 
the child's demise from SIDS." Addendum C at 13. Dr. Jacobs had 
previous set forth how the hospital had failed to properly make 
records available to detail previous hospital visits and how the 
two respondent physicians should have required the deceased to 
have been observed in the hospital and required the use of a home 
apnea monitor. Therefore the proper legal cause of the demise of 
the infant was presented when looked at in the light most 
favorable to Petitioner. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO PETITIONER TO SHOW 
A LACK OF INTERVENING FACTORS 
The court in granting summary judgment for respondents ruled 
that the respondents were not a proximate cause of the infant 
plaintiff's death inasmuch as there were intervening events tat 
superceded any misconduct on the part of the said defendants. 
Addendum A at page 2. The motions for summary judgment do not 
specify any factual elements of any intervening events and there 
3 
is nothing in the record to give Plaintiffs cause to rebut any 
assertion of superceding causes. Therefore, to have required and 
ruled on intervening acts occurring without bringing allowing 
rebuttal impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and denied 
Plaintiff due process. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 1990. 
David Grinasl 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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foregoing petitioner writ of certiorari were mailed postage 
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Attorneys for Holy Cross 
Gary D. Stott 
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Attorneys for Respondent Nickol 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD# as guardians 
and parents of and on 




DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 
Civil No« C86-925Q 
Judge Richard Moffat 
•oooOooo-
The defendants David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, and Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital's Motion! for fummary judgment 
having come up for hearing on December 23 , 1987# and the 
court having heard additional arguments on January 5# 19889 
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits 
in this matter, and the court having found as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have not established through comp«t«nt 
ADDENDUM B 
8 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Albert John Butterfield and 
Angela Butterfield, on behalf 
of Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, 
and Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital, 
Defendant and Respondents, 
P I L E D 
MAR £81990 
r r *n r 
* of *i«.Court 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880347-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for the 
Butterfields 
R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake City, for Okubo 
Gary D. Stott, Salt Lake City, for Nickol 
David W. Slagle, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1 
LARSON, Judge: 
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing this action for wrongful death, which they allege to 
be due to medical malpractice by the defendants. Because of a 
lack of evidence in the record concerning proximate cause, we 
affirm. 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
The Butterfields' infant daughter Tiffany died at home on 
December 20, 1984 of sudden infant death syndrome. She was 
born June 30, 1984. On that day and again on July 16, 1984, 
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a pediatrician. On 
two occasions in July and August 1984, the Butterfields noted 
apparent problems in Tiffany's breathing and took her to the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital ("Holy 
Cross"), where she was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas 
Nickol, an emergency room physician and general practitioner. 
Thereafter, the Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the 
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a family 
practitioner. He examined Tiffany on five occasions in August 
through mid-December, 1984. 
Following his August 16, 1984 examination, Dr. Nickol 
recommended close observation of Tiffany's breathing with 
attention to possible cyanosis or blue discoloration. However, 
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross referred the 
Butterfields to a physician with more extensive expertise 
specifically in infant breathing disorders. They also did not 
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring equipment. The 
record does not indicate what, if any, care or treatment was 
provided by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing problems 
during the last four months of her life. 
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued Drs. Nickol 
and Okubo and Holy Cross (but not Dr. McClellan) for medical 
malpractice, filing their complaint on December 15, 1986. On 
August 25, 1987, the district court held a scheduling 
conference, after which an order issued stating that "All 
discovery must be completed, including the filing of 
depositions[,] by December 11, 1987." On December 11, 1987, 
the Butterfields moved to extend the discovery deadline in 
relation to Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in relation 
to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and 11, 1987, the defendants 
filed motions for summary judgment accompanied by affidavits 
stating in essence that the defendants' treatment of Tiffany 
had not fallen below the applicable standard of care and was 
not the cause of her death. The court heard those motions on 
December 23, 1987. The Butterfields had no expert testimony in 
the record in their favor until the day before the summary 
judgment hearing, when they filed an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry 
Jacobs. They attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on 
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next day. The copy 
intended for Dr. Nickol#s counsel was left with a security 
guard employed at the office building at which counsel works, 
and Dr. Okubo's counsel could not locate any served copy until 
after the summary judgment hearing. 
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The trial court noted the apparent defects in service of 
the Jacobs affidavit, and seems to have concluded that, with or 
without the Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields had failed to 
establish a prima facie case because no competent expert 
testimony indicated either a breach of the standard of care or 
that the defendants' medical treatment proximately caused the 
child's death. The principal2 issues presented are therefore 
(1) whether the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration 
in ruling on the motion/ and (2) whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to create a factual issue about whether 
the defendants both breached the standard of care applicable to 
each and thereby proximately caused Tiffany's death. 
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit 
As courts have often noted, a party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment that is supported by affidavits and/or other 
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
. . . otherwise . • . must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him."3 in this case, therefore, the Butterfields had 
2. The Butterfields also argue that the district court should 
have granted their motion to extend the time limit for 
completion of discovery. However, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's scheduling of the case. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
11 16.22 at 16-123 (2d ed.1989). Moreover, since the case was 
properly dismissed on summary judgment, additional time for 
discovery would serve no purpose. The Butterfields were not 
entitled to delay the summary judgment because they failed to 
proceed under Utah R. Civ, P. 56(f), See Cox v. Winters, 678 
P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, 
Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Downtown Athletic 
Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 (Utah Ct. 1987). 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); Franklin Fin, v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
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to introduce evidence supporting those elements4 of their 
case that had been effectively challenged by the defendants in 
moving for summary judgment. A major part of the Butterfields' 
evidence was the Jacobs affidavit-
The defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit should not 
be considered because it was not properly served on their 
counsel. Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the court; 
it must also be served on opposing counsel no later than the 
day before the hearing on the motion,5 to allow them an 
opportunity to prepare for the hearing. We have previously 
noted that an affidavit that has not been properly served 
should not be considered, and the motion may be resolved 
without it. P & B Land, Inc. v. Kluncrervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, however, the facts relating to the lack of 
service were not suitably established. The Jacobs affidavit 
was accompanied by a certificate attesting to proper service. 
The only evidence to the contrary in the record is the unsworn 
verbal representations of counsel about the defects in service, 
representations based in part on hearsay conversations with 
their office personnel. While we have no reason to question 
the accuracy of counsel's representations, the Jacobs affidavit 
was nevertheless the principal feature of the Butterfields1 
opposition to the potentially dispositive motions for summary 
judgment. The certificate of service is entitled to be taken 
at face value, unless admissible evidence shows it to be 
erroneous. The representations of counsel, though entirely 
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence, and 
therefore do not suffice to establish facts showing fatal 
deficiencies in the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We 
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in determining whether 
the Butterfields came forward with sufficient evidence to 
warrant denial of summary judgment. 
4. Briefly, to recover for medical malpractice, the plaintiff 
must show that he or she suffered an injury that was actually 
and proximately caused by an act or omission of the medical 
professional that fell below the standard of care for that 
professional's medical field or specialty. See Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987); 
Hoopiiana v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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Standard of Care 
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical 
doctor's services, expert medical testimony must ordinarily6 
be presented in order to establish the standard of care by 
which the doctor's conduct is to be measured and that the 
injury was proximately caused by conduct of the doctor that 
fell below that standard of care. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 
262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 
817, 821-22 (Utah App. 1988); Martin'v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338 
(Utah App. 1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). Further, the expert 
testimony, like the standard of care which is its subject 
matter, is specific to the particular medical specialty or area 
of expertise of the defendant. In other words, one physician 
is not qualified to give an admissible opinion on the treatment 
provided by another physician, unless the physician giving the 
opinion is shown to have familiarity with the treating 
physician's particular area of practice.7 
The expert affidavits submitted by the defendants in 
moving for summary judgment indicate both that the attesting 
expert was qualified to render an opinion on the standard of 
care applicable to the particular defendant about which he was 
speaking, and that the defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not 
fall below that standard. The question thus becomes whether 
Dr. Jacobs also indicated familiarity with the standards of 
6. An exception is made where the physician's error is so 
plain and simple that it is within the range of ordinary lay 
knowledge. For example, in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1980), a surgeon left a surgical cutting needle inside the 
plaintiff's body, and the court held that expert testimony on 
the standard of care was not needed, in essence because 
everybody knows that a surgeon should not leave inside a sharp, 
foreign object used to make the incision. In this case, 
however, whether the defendants should have taken additional 
steps to prevent future apnea is a factual question not within 
the range of ordinary lay knowledge. 
7. Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see 
also Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822. 
R80347-CA 5 
care applicable to the defendants sufficient to warrant 
consideration of his opinion. In that regard, Dr. Jacobs 
stated: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State 
of Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon 
since 1974. I have past experience in 
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in 
private practice and hospitals, including 
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 
3* I am familiar with the Standard of Care, 
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics 
and emergency room medicine, as well as 
hospital responsibility for adequate record 
keeping and availability of previous records 
during later follow up care for a related 
complaint. i 
Based on those statements, there is reason to question whether 
Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather eclectic background qualifies him 
as an expert in all three of the defendants' fields of medical 
practice. However, our role is not to cross-examine the 
affidavit by conjecture;8 rather, we take it at face value, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Butterfields, since they lost the summary judgment motions in 
the court below.9 In that light, Dr. Jacobs' representations 
of his competence are not so patently unfounded or conclusory 
that they can be wholly disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs' 
opinion concerning the standard of care contradicts those of 
the defendants' experts, it demonstrates the existence of a 
dispute of material fact, which precludes summary judgment on 
the question of the standard of care. 
Proximate Causation 
However, while Dr. Jacobs' criticizes the defendants' 
treatment of Tiffany, he does not establish the requisite 
8. See Reevesf 764 p.2d at 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate 
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility[.])H 
9. Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989); 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 
1987). 
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causal link between that treatment and Tiffany's death. Dr. 
Jacobs opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe home 
monitoring of Tiffany's breathing, and perhaps also a more 
generalized inattention to Tiffany's breathing problems, 
constitute treatment falling below the standard of care,, 
However, those asserted errors occurred in mid-1984, whereas 
Tiffany died on December 19, 1984, four months after she had 
been placed in the care of another medical practitioner. The 
defendants argue that these facts, along with expert opinion, 
indicate that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately 
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores the causation 
question. 
The element of proximate causation in a tort case inquires 
into whether the defendant could, under the circumstances, 
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of which the plaintiff 
complains would result from the defendant's breach of the 
standard of care. See Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 1039 
(Utah 1987); Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240, 
245-47 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29 
(Utah 1985). Without proof of proximate cause, the plaintiff 
cannot recover in tort. Powell Div. of Dow Chemical U.S.A. v. 
Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 
1988); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 
1082-83 (Utah 1985). 
When proximate causation was called into question by the 
defendants in moving for summary judgment, it was incumbent on 
the Butterfields to come forward with evidence of a causal link 
between the purported malpractice and the harm for which they 
seek damagese10 However, there is nothing in the Jacobs 
affidavit to indicate that the defendants' medical treatment 
proximately caused Tiffany's death, or even caused her death at 
all. From the record, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the defendants may have erred, but fortuitously, their error 
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause, of Tiffany's 
death.11 The allegation of causation, a critical element of 
the Butterfields' prima facie case, thus remains 
unsubstantiated. 
10. Hunt v. Hurst, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1990). 




IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 




DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF H. BARRY 
JACOBS, M-D, 
Civil No. C86-9250 
Judge Richard Moffatt 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake ) as, 
H. Barry Jacobs# M*D*, being first duly sworn on oath 
deposes and states: 
1* I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland 
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. **3^h«w*p«st* 
experience in Emergency Boom care at four hospit^a, &x*d 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients" ia~priy*£ji pf£gt|ca $gd 
hospitals, including the Children** Hniplt^\, jj^ JfttthliB^ £ITi P*c* 
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric 
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R- Butterfield, as well as the 
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield* and 
have met with Albert Butterfield* 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable 
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as 
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and 
availability of previous records during later follow up care for 
a related complaint* 
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of 
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided 
to Tiffany Buttarfield by Dr* Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below* 
5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's 
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or 
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr. 
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was 
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis. Also omitted was 
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or 
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of 
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory 
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the 
parents, such an omission contributed directly to the failure to 
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis. 
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric 
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made 
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained 
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to 
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need 
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility. 
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did 
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not 
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent1s 
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis 
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being 
transported to the hospital that did resolve the cynosis. 
8. It is alleged that the prior emergency room record of 
07/04/8 4 could not be obtained. Such data- should have been 
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained 
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis 
including SIDS should have been developed. 
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on 
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge 
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and 
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician. The 
child's parrents insist they did not receive any follow-up 
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for same. 
10. There are no records available to detail what was 
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about 
10/01/8 4. The parent's deposition indicates the child again had 
an apneic episode and required stimulation. The deposition goes 
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted 
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had 
surfaced to explain the child's problems or account for the 
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety. 
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from 
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and 
monitoring for apnea followed by the issuance of a home apnea 
monitor# or simply arranging for a home apnea monitor. 
warrented foUowxng the 0 / o J / f l J ^ 8 " ^ t h a t 8 U c h c " « « • »<* 
opinion that such" care was Vu(l\ f T T ^ V l a l t ' X affl o f t h e 
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 fnd 1 0 / 0 1 A V * * ° V l 6 / 8 4 P * " " r i c 
Drs. Okubo and Nichols and a dutv li V emergency room v i s i t s , 
was carried out and fa i l ed ?o do s o ! " n e c a a a a r y follow-up 
a c c e p t e d ' s t a n ^ r f U e g l i g e ^ e ? P ^ d ° w i ^ J " 1 * * " care below an 
c h i l d ' s demise from SIDs! * P™* 1 **^ cause of the 
Further af f iant sa i th naught. 
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